Allied forces and their understanding of propaganda

I found many of the events mentioned in Rentschler's appendix to be worthy of discussion or further research, but one that stood out to me as particularly relevant to this class was the criteria at the very end for the censorship of German films by Allied forces (September 28, 1945). Aside from the issue of the merits censorship itself, which could easily be brought in, what comes to mind is: exactly which films were these 700 that were banned by the Allies? And what implications does this have? If I had to guess, I would surmise that blatantly offensive films such as Jud Suss would be on the list, but what about the films in which the propaganda is more subtle? Because, by definition of what Goebbels and his entire branch set out to do with films under the Third Reich, wouldn't all films produced in that era qualify as violating the new rules for postwar censorship, since they were supposed to be infused in some way or other with Nazi sentiment? Or if not, did that mean that Goebbels & co. failed to produce the kinds of films they were aiming to produce? What probably happened was neither of the above, but instead the Allied rules simply had a different understanding of what was offensive/harmful/propaganda. They probably only screened out those films which were overtly offensive-- but in the end, we seem to have learned, the overtly offensive films usually are the most ineffective and easily rejected. Which means that they left all the truly dangerous ones loose to do the kinds of damage Goebbels intended.

Basically, it would be interesting to know which films the Allied forces censored, and where they fit on the "successful/unsuccessful" and "overtly/covertly propaganda" spectrums -- to see how much overlap there is between the various categories.

Shareholders of the Third Reich

15 February: Goebbels speaks to the film industry: "Now that film has come into the possession of the Reich, we have essentially experienced the following change: whereas film used to be governed by majority shareholders, it now is governed by the national leadership."

This passage on p. 255 of Rentschler's book typified the position of the Third Reich in response to many of its actions in the early 1940s; we do it for the good of the nation, therefore it is a justifiably good thing. Yet there really is no distinction between the former "majority shareholders" that ran the film industry and the film industry under the rule of Hitler and Goebbels. Just as they did with the German government, the Nazi party organized a hostile takeover of the film industry insuring that they were the ones in charge. More importantly, this was done without a democratic means as chosen by the people. Hitler, Goebbels, and the rest of the Ministry of Propaganda were as much shareholders as their predecessors in the film industry. Their chief profit goal may not have been financial, but they invested a lot of time, money, and resources into the film industry in order to win the support of the German people. Therefore, it's clear that there is very little difference between the former "majority shareholders" and the then-current "national leadership."

Striving for Mediocrity?

One thing that struck me from the appendix was Goebbels’ quote on page 251, where he says that “we have only good films and bad films. We lack the serviceable middle range.” The first thing that is interesting about this quote is that Goebbels seems to want mediocre films. Instead of striving for only good films, he wants films that are good, bad and in the middle. I don’t know if he is referring to the quality of the film or the quality of the propaganda but either way, it seems odd that a high ranking Nazi officer would strive for mediocrity instead of demanding the best. The second thing that strikes me is that maybe Goebbels’ mind works on a binary scale that can only register movies as good or bad. Since he views the films in terms of their quality of propaganda and the message that they send to the audience, he might make one conclusive decision on a film instead of wavering. This seems to me to be similar to the binaries that were prevalent in Nazi thinking, like good vs. bad, clean vs. dirty, German vs. the other. 

Flight to the Moon

In his address on the 4th-5th of March in 1938 at the annual meeting of the RFK in Berlin, Goebbels called for "productions with greater verisimilitude (Lebensnähe)" and that film "should hold up a mirror to the world and everyday life.

So the question we have for you, Herr Goebbels, is this - Where or how does such a film as Münchhausen, in all its absurdity and even surreptitious argument against your cause, fall into this category of proper films? Does this still somehow fall under your propaganda plans? Fortunately, as you yourself stated, propaganda must be a subtle thing, lest it immediately lose its effectiveness, and this film is certainly subtle in varying nuances.

But surely not that subtle.

Herr Goebbels, it seems you have fallen prey to propaganda yourself. The fact that Münchhausen was clearly allowed under your permission to be produced and shown to the audiences of Germany shows nothing but your blindness to the film's propaganda, surfacing time and time again throughout the piece, just under your very nose. Or perhaps we could say that with the hard times, Herr Goebbels, the faltering hope of the Nazi party led to your own faltering strictness and formerly stern regulations on what moves the powerful propaganda pawn of the film industry could execute in the game against Germany's enemies. It seems that being cornered ever more tightly, Münchhausen was a final sign of surrender when there were no other moves left.

Appendix 1940-1945

I found this reading to be very interesting, because the chronology was so random. For example it says on March 29, 1940 that "Goebbels stresses the important political role of comedies and musicals" (252). Following this it says on April 27, 1940 "Heinrich Himmler orders that a concentration camp be established at Auschwitz" (251). I found this to be very odd how the listing of a need for musicals was right by the listing of an opening of a concentration camp. These two topics are complete opposites of each other, therefore with them listed on the same page it is odd because the level of importance between the two is not equal at all. I also found it to be kind of funny that Goebbels had so many comments about the propaganda films, that they almost overshadowed the war. Obviously that was his job, but he clearly took it extremely seriously to the point that it was all he was thinking about. Goebbels rally tries to tie together theatrics and the war effort as a means of success in both areas. I feel that in some areas Goebbels is in a state of dillusion. I think he has this idea that germany is going to be indistructable and with the help of all the propaganda that he is spreading people are going to side with Germany in all countries. Goebbels is constantly coming up with new ideas in hopes to spark some interest in German films. Since sometimes he even hires banned writers because he knows that they are very talented and he hopes that people will be receptive to his work. The more receptive people are, the more poeple will love Germany, and the better chance Hitler has of succeeding in ruling the world.

They're Onto You, Mr. Goebbels

Germany’s extensive use of film as propaganda during WW II was no secret to the Allies, who recognized the role cinema played in generating desired perceptions of the war and of the world at the time. I found it very interesting to read that by August 1, 1943, the Allies’ bombings had destroyed 237 cinemas within Germany. For some reason, I tend to think of either residential or industrial areas as common targets for bombings, and had never thought about buildings such as cinemas being affected by wars. Although more than 6,000 cinemas still stood at the end of the year, the loss of hundreds of cinemas must have nevertheless made it increasingly difficult to spread propaganda. On a related note, I also found it interesting that between 1933 and 1940 Germany released more than 80 feature films every year, a quantity that was never reached between 1941 and 1945. In 1945, for instance, only 12 feature films were premiered in Germany. This fact, combined with the decreased number of cinemas in Germany as a result of bombings, indicates that Germany was much more successful at generating and distributing propaganda while leading the war, and was unable to maintain the same level of production and distribution once the tables had turned.

To carry on with the topic of the Allied understanding of the threat of German propaganda, I found it very interesting to read that MGM was ordered in August of 1940 to close its German offices. This is a clear indication that the non-German film industry was starting to understand how works were being used for manipulative purposes. This brings me to the last point I wanted to touch on. On September 28, 1945, the Allies met to decide how German films were to be censored following the war, which shows very clearly that films were viewed as potentially dangerous. The result was that German films were not allowed to be shown in German cinemas that met certain criteria. I thought this was especially intriguing because I had never previously considered how a cinema can influence an audience’s political views. It is obvious how films can do such things, but it had never occurred to me that certain atmospheres can project specified political messages. This is likely due to the fact that modern American cinemas generally consist of neon lights and lots of bright colors advertising whatever food and drinks are available, which all the more displays the stark contrast between what is now the “normal” cinematic experience in America and what the experience was in Germany 65 years ago.

Censorship

One thing I found interesting in the chronology in Rentschler’s book was the guidelines for postwar censorship of German films at the end of the appendix. The guidelines bring up the question of free speech, and whether it is ok to censor something, even when it is obviously bad. One of the most interesting of the ten guidelines was number 5, which states that films would be banned that “ridicule, or seem derogatory or uncomplimentary of, Allied peoples, their governments, their political or national leaders.” Like the other guidelines on the list, one can easily see why the allies would have wanted to follow this policy. As they were engaged in a complicated and extensive process of reconstruction in Germany, the last thing they would have wanted was a film stirring up resentment of allied actions among the German population. However, the stipulation banning “uncomplimentary” works is something I find particularly intriguing. Not only does this seem like a loose term that can be applied to a lot of things, but rather than just preventing films glorifying Germany or the German Army or fascist ideals, it bans films that go against the allied cause. In other words, instead of defining censorship as an effort against a National Socialist past, it becomes an effort in support of a future under an Allied system. That the allies wanted to prescribe Germany’s political future is not surprising. After all, the BRD and DDR are examples of the direct influence of the western and Soviet powers respectively. However, it is interesting that this subtle guideline seems to suggest an awareness of the necessity of film to do so.